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Abstract– In general, a newly purchased item or system is warranted for a specific period.
When the system fails during the warranty period, it is repaired free of charge. Even if
the system is repairable, there exists some warranty services under which the manufacturer
replaces the failed system during the warranty period. This study considers a case where a
manufacturer offers an additional warranty service under which the failed system is replaced
by a new one for its first failure, but minimal repairs are carried out to the system for its
succeeding failures before the warranty expires. In this paper, we propose a mathematical
model for setting a suitable charge of such an additional warranty service. Numerical examples
assuming a personal computer are also presented.
Keywords– Warranty Contract, Replacement, Expected Utility, Expected Profit, Optimal
Strategy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Studies on warranty have been conducted in these decades, and a large number of warranty
policies have also been investigated [1–11]. Most of them analyze warranty cost after both
the warranty policy and the reliability of the objective system are specified. There also
exist a few studies, which deal with optimization problems on the warranty fee or the length
of warranty period. Murthy and Asgharizadeh [12] and Asgharizadeh and Murthy [13] have
treated the contract price optimization problem of a maintenance service contract. Sandoh
and Rinsaka [14] have dealt with the same problem for the software system.
From the customer’s viewpoint, Iskandar and Sandoh [15], and Iskandar, Klefsjo¨ and
Sandoh [16] have discussed an opportunistic preventive replacement policy under a general
warranty. Rinsaka, Sandoh and Nakagawa [17] have considered a preventive replacement
policy under the additional warranty service under which, throughout the warranty period,
(1) the manufacturer copes with the first failure of the objective system by replacing it
with a new one free of charge, but (2) he conducts minimal repairs to its succeeding failures
without charge during the warranty period, and finally (3) he performs minimal repairs
to the failures at a suitable fee after the warranty expires.
This paper deals with the same additional warranty service and discusses an optimal
price setting of such an additional warranty service fee. The structure of this paper is as
follows. Section 2 explains the options of the warranty proposed in this study, and the
assumptions of the model. In Section 3, the customer’s monetary returns under each option
are formulated to obtain his expected utilities. In Section 4, the manufacturer’s expected
profits are formulated under each option. In Section 5, after discussed is the customer’s
optimal strategy that maximizes his expected utility, the manufacturer’s optimal strategy
maximizing his expected profit is discussed. Section 6 discusses characteristics of proposed
model, by showing numerical examples assuming a personal computer.
2. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Let us consider a case where a customer purchases a system at cost Ps(> 0) and the
system is accompanied by a base warranty with a warranty period (0, τ ](τ > 0). Under
the base warranty, if the system fails during the warranty period, the manufacturer will
conduct minimal repairs [18, 19] to the failed system without charge. After the warranty
expires, he performs a minimal repair to the failed system by charging the customer for
a fee Cs(> 0). The average cost Cr(0 < Cr < Cs) is incurred to the manufacturer per
minimal repair activity.
We consider the two options as follows:
Option A1 At an additional expense under this option, the customer can receive the
warranty services as follows: Throughout the warranty period (0, τ ], (1) the manufacturer
copes with the first failure of the system by replacing it with a new one free of charge,
but (2) he conducts minimal repairs to its succeeding failures without charge. After the
warranty expires, the manufacturer carries out minimal repairs to the failed system and
charges the customer for Cs per minimal repair activity.
Option A2 Under this option, the customer pays no additional fee. He can receive the
base warranty service mentioned above.
The customer’s choice between Options A1 and A2 is influenced by the price structure
and the attitude of the customer against risk. The customer would select an option yielding
a larger value of his expected utility. If his expected utility should be negative under both
Options A1 and A2, the customer would alternatively choose the following option.
Option A0 The customer does not purchase the system under this option.
The optimal choice for the customer is based on maximizing the expected utility func-
tion. We assume that it is given by
U(ω) =
1− e−βω
β
, β > 0 (1)
where U(ω) is the utility associated with a wealth of ω. The advantage of this utility
function is that the initial wealth is of no importance. Note that this captures the attitude
to risk. The risk aversion increases with β.
Let us consider the case where the customer chooses Option A1. When the system
fails for the first time during the warranty period, it is replaced by a new one by the
manufacturer free of charge. In addition, if the replaced system fails again before the
warranty expires, a minimal repair is conducted free of charge. Let us denote, by N1, the
number of failures after the warranty expires, and N1 satisfies
Pr{N1 = n} =
{
[H(T−X1)−H(τ−X1)]n
n! e
−[H(T−X1)−H(τ−X1)] X1 ≤ τ, n = 0, 1, 2, · · ·
[H(T )−H(τ)]n
n! e
−[H(T )−H(τ)] X1 > τ, n = 0, 1, 2, · · ·
(2)
where H(·) is a mean value function of a nonhomogeneous Poisson process and X1(> 0)
is a random variable expressing time to the first failure. It is assumed that both replace
and repair time are negligible.
We consider the case when the customer chooses Option A2. Whenever the system
fails before the warranty expires, the base warranty service is applied to the failed system,
that is, a minimal repair is executed to the failed system free of charge. Let N2 denote
the number of failures after the warranty expired, then N2 satisfies
Pr{N2 = n} = [H(T )−H(τ)]
n
n!
e−[H(T )−H(τ)] n = 0, 1, 2, · · · . (3)
In the following, we assume
[H ′(t)]′ = h′(t) > 0. (4)
Inequality (4) signifies that the system becomes easy to fail with progress of time.
3. CUSTOMER’S EXPECTED UTILITY
Let R(> 0) denote a revenue per unit of time the customer can receive by operating the
system. The customer’s monetary return under Option A1 is given by
ω(A1) = RT − Ps − Pa − CsN1, (5)
while the customer’s monetary return under Option A2 is given by
ω(A2) = RT − Ps − CsN2. (6)
Under Option A0, it is given by
ω(A0) = 0. (7)
From Eqs.(1),(2) and (5), the customer’s expected utility under Option A1 becomes
E[U(A1;Pa, Cs)] =
1
β
{
1− e−β(RT−Ps−Pa)
[∫ τ
0
e−[H(T−x)−H(τ−x)](1−e
βCs)dF (x)
+ e−[H(T )−H(τ)](1−e
βCs)F (τ)
]}
, (8)
where
F (x) = 1− e−H(x), (9)
F (x) = 1− F (x), (10)
f(x) =
dF (x)
dx
. (11)
From Eqs.(1), (3), (6) and (7), likewise the customer’s expected utility under Options
A2 and A0 respectively become
E[U(A2;Pa, Cs)] =
1
β
[
1− e−β(RT−Ps)−[H(T )−H(τ)](1−eβCs)
]
(12)
and
E[U(A0;Pa, Cs)] = 0. (13)
4. MANUFACTURER’S EXPECTED PROFIT
This section formulates the manufacturer’s expected profit which depends on both the
manufacturer’s decision and the customer’s. It is assumed in the following that the man-
ufacturer is risk neutral and is interested in maximizing his expected profit.
If the customer selects Option A1, the expected number of minimal repairs which the
manufacturer carries out free of charge during the warranty period is given by
∫ τ
0
H(τ − x)dF (x). (14)
The expected number of minimal repair after the warranty period is given by
∫ τ
0
[H(T − x)−H(τ − x)]dF (x) + [H(T )−H(τ)]F (τ). (15)
Hence, the manufacturer’s expected profit under Option A1 is written as
E[pi(Pa, Cs;A1)]
= Ps + Pa − P ′s −
(
P ′s − Pv
)
F (τ)− Cr
∫ τ
0
H(τ − x)dF (x)
+ (Cs − Cr)
{∫ τ
0
[H(T − x)−H(τ − x)]dF (x) + [H(T )−H(τ)]F (τ)
}
, (16)
where P ′s(> 0) is the prime cost, and Pv(> 0) signifies the salvage value at the time of
replacement. Parameter Pv is introduced because the manufacturer sells each individual
failed system as a second-hand product after repair .
On the other hand, if the customer chooses Option A2, the manufacturer’s expected
profit is given by
E[pi(Pa, Cs;A2)] = Ps − P ′s − CrH(τ) + (Cs − Cr) [H(T )−H(τ)]. (17)
If the customer chooses Option A0, the manufacturer’s expected profit becomes
E[pi(Pa, Cs;A0)] = 0. (18)
In the above we have derived the manufacturer’s expected profit for each case where
the customer chooses Option Ak for k = 0, 1, 2.
5. OPTIMAL STRATEGY
This section discusses the optimal strategy of the customer by maximizing his expected
utility in Eqs.(8), (12) and (13), and then we seek for the optimal strategy for the manu-
facturer.
5.1 Customer’s Optimal Strategy
We first compare OptionA1 withA2. OptionA1 is preferred to OptionA2 ifE[U(A1;Pa, Cs)]
> E[U(A2;Pa, Cs)], and if E[U(A1;Pa, Cs)] < E[U(A2;Pa, Cs)], A2 is preferred to A1. The
customer is indifferent between two options if E[U(A1;Pa, Cs)] = E[U(A2;Pa, Cs)], which
is equivalent to
Pa =
1
β
{
−ξ
(
1− eβCs
)
− ln
[∫ τ
0
e−ρ(x)(1−e
βCs)dF (x) + e−ξ(1−e
βCs)F (τ)
]}
, (19)
where
ρ(x) ≡ H(T − x)−H(τ − x) (20)
and
ξ ≡ H(T )−H(τ). (21)
Let Ψ1(Cs) express the right-hand-side of Eq.(19).
Secondly, Option A1 is compared with A0. Option A1 is better than Option A0 for the
customer if E[U(A1;Pa, Cs)] > 0, while if E[U(A1;Pa, Cs)] < 0, Option A0 is preferred.
By solving E[U(A1;Pa, Cs)] = 0 with respect to Pa and letting Pa = Ψ2(Cs) denote its
solution, we have, as reservation price for the system,
Ψ2(Cs) = RT − Ps − 1
β
ln
[∫ τ
0
e−ρ(x)(1−e
βCs)dF (x) + e−ξ(1−e
βCs)F (τ)
]
. (22)
Thirdly, we make a comparison of Options A2 and A0. Between Options A0 and A2,
the solution to E[U(A2;Pa, Cs)] = 0 with respect to Cs is given by
Cs =
1
β
ln
[
β(RT − Ps)
ξ
+ 1
]
(23)
as a reservation price for Cs.
Let Ωi(i = 0, 1, 2) be defined by
Ω0 =
{
(Pa, Cs);Pa ≥ Ψ2(Cs), Cs ≥ Cs
}
, (24)
Ω1 = {(Pa, Cs);Pa < Ψ1(Cs), Pa < Ψ2(Cs)} , (25)
Ω2 =
{
(Pa, Cs);Pa ≥ Ψ1(Cs), Cs < Cs
}
, (26)
and the optimal strategy of the customer becomes
A∗(Pa, Cs) =

A0, if (Pa, Cs) ∈ Ω0
A1, if (Pa, Cs) ∈ Ω1
A2, if (Pa, Cs) ∈ Ω2
. (27)
Figure 1 shows the characterization of customer’s optimal actions.
5.2 MANUFACTURER’S OPTIMAL STRATEGY
Figure 1: Characterization of customer’s optimal actions.
The manufacturer’s optimal strategy for Pa and Cs is obtained by maximizing his expected
profit considering the customer’s optimal strategy A∗(Pa, Cs).
For (Pa, Cs) ∈ Ω1, the customer’s optimal option is A1. In this case, the manu-
facturer’s expected profit is given by Eq.(16). Since ∂E[pi(Pa, Cs;A1)]/∂Pa > 0 and
∂E[pi(Pa, Cs;A1)]/∂Cs > 0, the manufacturer’s expected profit under Option A1 becomes
the maximum by a certain point on the curve Pa = Ψ2(Cs)(See Fig.1). By substituting
Pa = Ψ2(Cs) given by Eq.(22) for Eq.(16), the expected profit Π(Cs) on Pa = Ψ2(Cs)
becomes
Π(Cs)
= RT − P ′s −
(
P ′s − Pv
)
F (τ)− 1
β
ln
[∫ τ
0
e−ρ(x)(1−e
βCs)dF (x) + e−ξ(1−e
βCs)F (τ)
]
− Cr
∫ τ
0
H(τ − x)dF (x) + (Cs − Cr)
[∫ τ
0
ρ(x)dF (x) + ξF (τ)
]
.
(28)
By differentiating Π(Cs) with respect to Cs, Π′(Cs) ≤ 0 agrees with
eβCs
∫ τ
0 ρ(x)e
−ρ(x)(1−eβCs)dF (x) + ξe−ξ(1−e
βCs)F (τ)∫ τ
0 e
−ρ(x)(1−eβCs)dF (x) + e−ξ(1−e
βCs)F (τ)
≥
∫ τ
0
ρ(x)dF (x) + ξF (τ). (29)
Let L(Cs) denote the left-hand-side of Inequality(29). Then, we have
L(0) =
∫ τ
0
ρ(x)dF (x) + ξF (τ), (30)
and L′(Cs) > 0 from Appendix A. It follows that Π(Cs) is strictly decreasing in Cs. The
maximum expected profit is, therefore, obtained for C∗s → Cs + 0 and P ∗a → Ψ2(C∗s )− 0.
For (Pa, Cs) ∈ Ω2, the customer’s optimal option is A2. In this case, the manufacturer’s
expected profit is given by Eq.(17). The maximum expected profit is obtained for C∗s →
Cs − 0 and P ∗a > Ψ2(C∗s ).
Finally, for (Pa, Cs) ∈ Ω0, the customer’s optimal option is A0 and the manufacturer’s
expected profit is given by Eq.(18). In this case, the manufacturer cannot control his own
expected profit.
It can easily be shown that the manufacturer must select between either [C∗s → Cs+0
and P ∗a → Ψ2(C∗s ) − 0] or [C∗s → Cs − 0 and P ∗a > Ψ2(C∗s )] to maximize his expected
profit if one or both of these provide a positive expected profit. The optimal choice is the
one that gives a positive larger value for the expected profit. If both are negative, then
the best strategy is to have C∗s > Cs and P ∗a > Ψ2(C∗s ) so that the customer may choose
Option A0 and the manufacturer’s expected profit is given by Eq.(18).
6. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In the above, the customer’s and the manufacturer’s optimal strategies were discussed for
the additional warranty service. This section examines the characteristics of the proposed
model through the numerical examples assuming personal computer systems. We apply
the following function as the mean value function of nonhomogeneous Poisson process:
H(t) = λtm, t ≥ 0, λ > 0, m > 1. (31)
This function is introduced due to its simple structure satisfying Inequality (4).
In the following, we set up the parameters considering personal computers as an ob-
jective system. The case of τ = 1 (year., e.g.) is considered. Table 1 shows the case
considered here, and Fig.2 reveals the characterization of customer’s optimal actions.
Table 2 indicates the optimal strategies for the customer and the manufacturer. We
can observe in Table 2 that the reservation price Cs of Cs decreases with increasing λ,
which is also obtained by differentiation Cs in reference to λ through ξ. It is also observed
in Table 2 that the manufacturer’s maximum expected profit MEP (Ai) decreases with
increasing λ, where MEP (Ai) is given by
MEP (Ai) ≡ max
(Pa,Cs)∈Ωi
E[pi(Pa, Cs;Ai)], i = 1, 2. (32)
These observations signify that the manufacturer should decrease the charge of each min-
imal repair activity along with his maximum expected profit when the reliability of his
system is low.
Figure 3 shows sensitivities of the manufacturer’s maximum expected profit under
Options A1 and A2 when λ increases. In Fig.3,MEP (A2) is slightly larger thanMEP (A1)
for small values of λ, but MEP (A2) becomes smaller than MEP (A1) for large values of
λ although MEP (Ai) for i = 1, 2 turns to be negative as λ becomes large.
These tendencies can be explained as follows: For the high-reliability system, it is
difficult for the manufacturer to raise his own expected profit even if he provides the
customer with Options A1 and A2. However, he can raise his own expected profit by
providing Options A1 and A2 if the system has a suitably low reliability.
Table 1: Case.
Case a b c
λ 0.15 0.25 0.35
β 0.1
m 2.0
τ 1
T 5
R 7
Ps 15
P ′s 10
Pv 4.3
Cr 3
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study discussed an additional warranty service where the manufacturer copes with
the first failure of the system by replacing it with a new one, but he conducts minimal
repairs to its succeeding failures before the warranty expires. For such a service, we
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Table 2: Optimal strategies.
Case a b c
λ 0.15 0.25 0.35
Cs 4.41833 2.87682 2.13574
Ψ2(Cs) 0.49421 0.78948 1.05872
MEP (A1) 9.63963 3.79523 -2.48191
MEP (A2) 9.65598 3.51092 -3.30978
P ∗a , C∗s C∗s → Cs − 0 & C∗s → Cs + 0 & C∗s > Cs &
P ∗a > Ψ2(C∗s ) P ∗a → Ψ2(C∗s )− 0 P ∗a > Ψ2(C∗s )
A∗ A2 A1 A0
E[pi(P ∗a , C∗s ;A∗)] 9.65598 3.79523 0.00000
proposed a mathematical model to determine optimal strategies of the manufacturer and
the customer.
In this paper, we considered a warranty service that the manufacturer provides his
customer with a service of replacing the first system failure by a new one and carrying out
minimal repairs to the succeeding failures before the warranty expires. We can, however,
extend our model so that the manufacturer replaces the system with a new one for its first
k failures and conducts minimal repairs to the succeeding failures, although the analysis
becomes very complicated.
In recent years, retailers also provide customers with warranty services which are
slightly different from those by manufacturers. Mathematical models to deal with these
problems are under investigation.
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A. Proof of L′(Cs) > 0
By differentiating L(Cs) in Eq.(28) with respect to Cs, we have
L′(Cs) = βeβCs

[
∫ τ
0 ρ(x)e
−ρ(x)(1−eβCs)dF (x) + ξe−ξ(1−e
βCs)F (τ)]
× [∫ τ0 e−ρ(x)(1−eβCs)dF (x) + e−ξ(1−eβCs)F (τ)]
+eβCs
{
e−ξ(1−e
βCs)F (τ)× ∫ τ0 [ξ − ρ(x)]2 e−ρ(x)(1−eβCs)dF (x)
+
∫ τ
0 ρ
2(x)e−ρ(x)(1−e
βCs)dF (x)× ∫ τ0 e−ρ(x)(1−eβCs)dF (x)
− [∫ τ0 ρ(x)e−ρ(x)(1−eβCs)dF (x)]2}
[∫ τ
0 e
−ρ(x)(1−eβCs)dF (x) + e−ξ(1−eβCs)F (τ)
]2 . (A1)
Let Q(τ) be defined by
Q(τ) ≡
∫ τ
0
ρ2(x)D(x)dx×
∫ τ
0
D(x)dx−
[∫ τ
0
ρ(x)D(x)dx
]2
, (A2)
where
D(x) ≡ e−ρ(x)(1−eβCs)f(x), (A3)
and we clearly have Q(0) = 0. We also have
Q′(τ) = D(τ)
∫ τ
0
D(x)
[
ρ2(x) + ρ2(τ)− 2ρ(x)ρ(τ)
]
dx
= D(τ)
∫ τ
0
D(x) [ρ(x)− ρ(τ)]2 dx
≥ 0. (A4)
Since Q(τ) is an increasing function of τ , we have Q(τ) ≥ 0 and thus L′(Cs) ≥ 0. Conse-
quently L(Cs) is increasing in Cs.
